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Abstract: Historically, interconnection in the world of the Internet has been approached 
significantly differently from interconnection in the fixed Public Switched Telephone 
Network (PSTN) and the mobile Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN). As fixed and mobile 
networks evolve to Next Generation Networks (NGNs) based on the Internet Protocol (IP), 
it becomes increasingly necessary to merge these perspectives in order to achieve a 
unified and integrated approach to network interconnection. There is a rich history of 
economic analysis of IP-based and of conventional switched networks that began to 
converge early in this decade. In 2008, this issue is coming to a boil, as regulators seek to 
provide regulatory certainty for the build-out of NGNs, even in the face of substantial 
uncertainties, and even though practical experience with NGNs is still in a very preliminary 
state. What can we learn from the historical evolution of the theory of interconnection for 
Internet, NGN, PSTN and PLMN? What issues are "in play" today? What is the 
appropriate destination in the long term? What nearer term measures are appropriate? 
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istorically, interconnection in the world of the Internet has been 
approached significantly differently from interconnection in the fixed 
Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and the mobile Public 
Land Mobile Network (PLMN). As fixed and mobile networks evolve to Next 
Generation Networks (NGNs) based on the Internet Protocol (IP), it 
becomes increasingly necessary to merge these perspectives in order to 
achieve a unified and integrated approach to network interconnection. 
We note at the outset that our topic in this paper is interconnection, which 
enables the respective customers of two different network operators to 
communicate with one another. Interconnection is related to, but distinct 
from, network access, where one network operator procures services from 
another in order to serve its own customers. 
Throughout the world, the predominant commercial arrangements for 
interconnection of the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and its 
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mobile counterpart are based on Calling Party's Network Pays (CPNP).
CPNP is a system for interconnection of voice networks. The network of the 
party that places a voice call (the originating network) makes a wholesale 
payment to the network of the party that receives the call (the terminating 
network).
Why is there a wholesale payment? CPNP is based on a range of 
assumptions, many of which were dubious in the first instance; however, the 
system worked well enough in the past. The assumptions that undergird 
CPNP wholesale arrangements are: 
x  The network exists to support voice services; the majority of cost 
associated with network operation is attributable to voice services. 
x  All of the costs are properly attributable to the party that places the 
call, none to the party that receives the call. 
x  Only the calling party makes a retail payment to its service provider; 
thus, if there were no wholesale CPNP payment, the terminating network 
would receive no revenue at all. 
x  The voice service is indistinguishable and inseparable from the 
underlying network. 
While these assumptions may have been questionable for the PSTN in 
the past, they were at least good enough to be workable. The migration to 
IP-based NGNs going forward calls every one of these assumptions into 
question, to the point where the traditional CPNP system as we have known 
it is not sustainable going forward. Considering the assumptions in turn: 
x  NGNs do not exist solely to support voice – they also support data 
and video. The vast majority of traffic carried by most NGNs will be for data 
and video. Voice is a low-bandwidth application that is likely responsible for 
only a very small fraction of the traffic of the network (in most cases), and 
thus only a small fraction of the overall cost. 
x  For services other than traditional voice, there is no single model that 
is obviously or inherently appropriate for apportioning cost among the 
participants to an application layer interaction over an IP-based network. 
Even in today's network, it was never correct to attribute all cost to the party 
that iniates the call – if the party receiving the call did not receive value, he 
or she would simply hang up (JEON, LAFFONT & TIROLE, 2000; DE 
GRABA, 2000). 
x  The assumption that retail arrangements are invariably Calling Party 
Pays (CPP), with no retail payment by the party that receives the call, is J. S. MARCUS  19 
clearly irrelevant to other IP-based services. Even in today's network, these 
traditional arrangements are not the ones that most consumers would prefer; 
rather consumers would prefer true flat rate plans like those that exist in 
North America and in other countries that have low CPNP rates. 1
x  The assumption that the network and the service are indistinguishable 
is clearly inappropriate. IP-based NGNs are entirely capable of supporting 
third party independent service providers for voice, video and data. These 
services are likely to flourish unless network operators are permitted to 
suppress them through anticompetitive acts. 
Regulators have known for some time that a collision was coming. IP-
based interconnection has been studied by a number of National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs), including the Bundernetzagentur or BNetzA (Germany) 
(BNETZA, 2006; MARCUS, 2006a; VOGELSANG, 2006), Ofcom (UK) (see 
for instance OFCOM, 2005), and the NHH (Hungary) (WIK, 2007). The issue 
has been studied by the OECD (PALTRIDGE, 2006), It has been reviewed 
at least twice by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
(MARCUS, 2006b; MARCUS 2007). 
In 2008, this issue is coming to a boil, as regulators seek to provide 
regulatory certainty for the build-out of NGNs, even in the face of substantial 
uncertainties, and even though practical experience with NGNs is still in a 
very preliminary state. The issue has come to a head as a result of two 
consultations by the European Regulators' Group (ERG) (ERG, 2007; ERG, 
2008); a substantial report for the European Commission (WIK, 2008); and 
now a public consultation by the European Commission (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2008a). 
The next section of this article reviews the rich history of economic 
analysis of IP-based and of conventional switched networks – a literature 
that began to converge early in this decade. 
The subsequent sections of this paper review the major developments of 
2008, including the ERG consultation, the WIK report (of which this author 
was a principal contributor), and the Commission's consultation. We seek to 
explain the findings. We then close by comparing and contrasting the similar 
but not identical conclusions. 
1 Flat rate plans in the US and in countries with low or zero CPNP payments usually include all 
domestic calls. Flat rate plans in Europe either exclude calls with high CPNP payments (e.g. 
calls to off-net mobile users), or else are ridiculously expensive. 20     No. 72, 4
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  The literature of IP-based interconnection 
This section of the paper seeks to provide a brief historical overview of 
the literature on interconnection. For a more comprehensive annotated 
bibliography, the reader may wish to refer to WIK 2008. 
A purely theoretical literature on IP-based interconnection had already 
emerged by the early 1990s, concentrating primarily on abstract notions of 
congestion pricing. Unfortunately, this literature was extensively self-
referential, and largely disconnected from real world interests, real world 
concerns, and the real workings of the Internet. 
Serious economic analysis of the economics of the Internet could be said 
to have originated in the late 1990s with the mathematician Andrew Odlyzko, 
who published (and continues to publish) a range of thoughtful papers with 
solid empirical grounding (see, for instance, ODLYZKO, 2001). Topics 
included the rate of growth of the Internet; economic incentives (or lack of 
incentives) to implement differentiated quality of service; pricing structures 
and consumer preference (arguing that consumers greatly prefer flat rate 
arrangements, and are willing to pay a premium for them); and the relative 
value of content versus transmission in the Internet. 
Analysis of Internet interconnection took off in earnest starting in 1997. A 
series of high profile mergers (WorldCom/MCI and WorldCom/Sprint) could 
be said to have done for the literature of IP interconnection what two world 
wars did for the technology of aviation: the mergers created interest, 
commercial need, and funding, and thus spurred development of the state of 
the art in a way that would not have been possible in "peacetime". Potential 
anticompetitive effects in regard to Internet backbone peering featured 
prominently in both cases. 
Particularly noteworthy is the "CRT" paper (CRÉMER, 2000), which 
sought to explain the incentives to interconnect IP backbones, drawing on 
work by KATZ & SHAPIRO (1985) and FARRELL & SALONER (1985) 
regarding standards compliance in the presence of network externalities. 
The model incorporated basic elements of mathematical queueing theory to 
assess the likelihood that a firm that controlled access to a large enough 
fraction of the global user base might selectively degrade the quality of 
interconnection (or equivalently fail to upgrade capacity when required by 
growth) so as to disadvantage competitive rivals. J. S. MARCUS  21 
These same merger cases inspired a number of other papers by senior 
economists, including MILGROM et al. (2000). 
In parallel with these developments, a real literature on PSTN 
interconnection was taking shape, as exemplified by the "LRT" papers from 
a group at the IDEI in Toulouse (LAFFONT et al, 1998a, 1998b), and a 
comparably groundbreaking paper by Mark Armstrong (ARMSTRONG, 
1998). 
A number of the veterans of the WorldCom merger cases continued to be 
interested in these issues. Several of us came together to attempt a 
comprehensive economic assessment of Internet backbone peering in the 
"LMRT" paper, LAFFONT et al. (2003). The paper analyses peering 
incentives and economics using a model of differentiated service quality 
based on HOTELLING (1929). The analysis distinguishes between Internet 
content providers versus Internet users ("eyeballs"), thus anticipating the 
later seminal Toulouse work on two-sided markets (notably TIROLE & 
ROCHET, 2004)). Zero or non-zero access payments could readily be 
modeled. 2 The paper arrived at a number of important results and 
conclusions: 
x  The paper includes a brief discussion of the use of different access 
payments in exchange for the provision of different levels of Quality of 
Service (QoS). 3
x  The paper established a key bridge between the economic theory of 
Internet interconnection and that of PSTN interconnection. If one corrects for 
the "missing price" in PSTN voice arrangements – the fact that the recipient 
of a call generally does not pay for it – then the models turn out to be 
equivalent.
In traditional switched networks, the literature has been increasingly 
concerned with inefficiently high call termination rates under CPNP. These 
2 Many articles wrongly assume that all peering is free of charge, or even assume that any 
interconnection that is free of charge constitutes peering (and vice versa). This is incorrect. The 
distinction between peering versus other forms of Internet interconnection (e.g. transit) is that 
peers are obliged to carry traffic only to their respective customers (and thus to customers of 
their customers), but not to third parties. (See NRIC, 2001). This is a technical distinction, 
reflected in the construction of the Internet routing table. It has economic ramifications, but it is 
not primarily an economic distinction. Peering is often, but not always, implemented without cost 
to either network. When I was in industry, about 10% of my company’s peering relationships 
involved payment. 
3 This is an important result, but the discussion in the paper is brief to the point of being easily 
missed. The economics turned out to be straightforward. That is an important result in itself. 22     No. 72, 4
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high rates distort economic incentives, inflate retail prices, and thus 
artificially depress the number of calls placed to mobile phones (thus 
depressing usage at the same time that they provide a spur to adoption).
CAVE et al. (2003) argued that inefficiently high termination rates were 
causing huge economic transfers from fixed customers to mobile network 
operators, thus distorting the economics of both fixed and mobile networks. 
LITTLECHILD (2006) argues that the best remedy would be for Europe as a 
whole to adopt a US-based model of interconnection. 
The United States (along with Hong Kong, Singapore, Canada, and 
France prior to 2004) uses a different system that is often referred to as Bill 
and Keep. In the US, the local termination fees of dominant (SMP) fixed 
operators are limited to cost-based rates, but those of mobile and 
nondominant fixed are unrestricted, and subject to negotiation. Mobile-to-
Mobile (M2M) rates are often voluntarily set to zero (i.e. Bill and Keep). 
Many Americans incorrectly assume that this result is attributable solely to 
the use of voluntary negotiation; however, European experience prior to 
2002 directly contradicts that claim. The result is better understood as a 
result of the obligation that charges be reciprocal, i.e. equal in both 
directions (even between fixed and mobile operators), thus effectively 
preventing subsidies from the fixed market to the mobile, in conjunction with 
obligations to interconnect and to voluntarily negotiate rates or else have 
them imposed (DE GRABA, 2000; ATKINSON & BARNEKOV, 2000; 
MARCUS, 2004.  
The ITU has examined IP-based interconnection, with a focus on the 
migration to NGN, at least twice in recent years, first in (MARCUS, 2006) 
and more recently and expansively as a chapter in their annual Trends guide 
for 2007 (MARCUS, 2007). The latter paper is particularly concerned with 
the continued distorting effects of high termination rates as networks evolve 
to IP-based NGNs; however, its focus is on developing countries rather than 
on the developed world. With that in mind, MARCUS (2007) advocates that 
developing countries adopt mobile termination rates much lower than those 
that are common today – for example, India has achieved excellent results 
with fixed and mobile termination rates of about $0.005 per minute. 
The literature of interconnection has continued to evolve. ARMSTRONG 
& WRIGHT (2008) provides separate analyses of incentives for fixed 
operators versus mobile. In reality, the analysis is of operators whose 
termination rates are comparatively low, and capped, versus those whose 
rates are higher, and possibly not capped. The paper represents an 
important extension to existing theory. J. S. MARCUS  23 
Tomasso Valletti has written several relevant and noteworthy papers 
(with various co-authors). One (VALLETTI & HOUPIS, 2005) argues that 
there is no "silver bullet" as regards the termination rate – that there are 
many different factors that could be considered, and no uniquely correct way 
to set the rate (see also LITTLECHILD, 2006). Another (VALLETTI & 
GENAKOS, 2008) seeks to empirically estimate the magnitude of the so-
called "waterbed effect", which is the tendency for reductions in the 
termination fee to be partially offset by increases in the retail price (typically, 
increases in the monthly fee or reductions in handset subsidies). 
  Recent developments: The WIK report (2008) 
WIK's 2008 report on "The Future of IP Interconnection" (WIK, 2008) was 
not commissioned with the expectation that it would be part of an impending 
debate over termination rates; nonetheless, it has had a significant bearing 
on that debate. IP interconnection is increasingly intertwined with 
conventional fixed and mobile termination as these networks evolve to IP-
based NGNs. As it turns out, many of the findings of the report are relevant 
not only to future NGNs, but also to current switched networks. 4
Interconnection arrangements in the Internet have been relatively 
unproblematic, and regulation of Internet interconnection has rarely been felt 
to be necessary. Regulation of the voice service in traditional switched and 
mobile networks, by contrast, has usually been necessary in order to 
address the call termination monopoly. For newer networks that support both 
voice and data, the voice is  likely for the foreseeable future to continue to 
represent the majority of the revenue (albeit a small fraction of the traffic, 
and thus of the cost). A threshold question for the study was to evaluate the 
degree to which the termination monopoly would be relevant to future NGNs. 
Our conclusion was that service providers that possessed terminating 
monopoly power today would still possess it in an IP-based world. As long 
as no other service provider could complete calls to their customers, the 
migration to IP would not in and of itself change their market power in regard 
4 This author had the honour and good fortune to work with some exceptionally knowledgeable 
and talented colleagues on the project, many of whom had been studying these issues for many 
years.24     No. 72, 4
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to their voice services. This finding played a large role in our 
recommendations. 
We also found a number of concrete indications that both fixed and 
mobile operators were already taking whatever measures they could to 
preserve their existing call termination arrangements, as nearly as possible, 
as their networks evolved to IP-based NGNs. 
We felt that current termination arrangements generate significant 
inefficiencies and economic distortions in Europe today. They tend to inflate 
retail per-minute mobile prices, and thus to depress calls to mobile 
telephones. The transfers from fixed users to mobile operators continue to 
distort the evolution of both networks. The migration to NGN would not fix 
these problems; on the contrary, it might exacerbate them, as the 
termination fees would be associated with a voice service that was relevant 
to only a small and declining fraction of the cost of the network. 
We also felt, upon reflection, that it might be counterproductive to wait for 
the migration to IP-based interconnection to make changes. Many network 
operators benefit from high termination fees today, both directly and 
indirectly (for example, through their tendency to inflate retail prices); those 
operators would have no reason to voluntarily give up high termination rates. 
Thus, conditioning a change in the interconnection regime on the migration 
to IP-based interconnection might simply accentuate disincentives to migrate 
to IP-based interconnection in the first place. 
With all of this in mind, we argued that mobile termination rates should be 
moved in some way to much lower levels than are typical in Europe today 
(currently, they are 9.67 euro cents per minute - EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2008b). We recommended an accelerated glide path of 
somewhere between three and five years. 
We did not identify a specific level of rates at the end of that period. As 
noted earlier, there are a great many factors that could be reflected in 
determining an optimal termination rate. There are many advantages that 
would flow from the use of a maximum rate of zero (which is equivalent to 
mandating the use of Bill and Keep arrangements); however, we do not 
exclude the possibility that a low but non-zero rate might have advantages of 
its own. India seems to have achieved good results (in terms of retail prices, 
mobile phone usage, and rapidity of mobile penetration) with termination 
rates of about half a cent per minute for both fixed and mobile (MARCUS, 
2007). J. S. MARCUS  25 
We did not see the need for other remedies for IP-based interconnection. 
There are risks of new competitive bottlenecks, for example as a result of 
the introduction of NGN/IMS, but we felt that it would be premature to 
impose prophylactic regulation. We did not identify concrete, immediate 
problems with IP-based applications other than voice. 
We also considered the network neutrality debate that continues to rage 
in the United States. The migration to IP introduces the risk that network 
operators that possess some form of market power might choose to impose 
subtle anticompetitive degradations to the Quality of Service (QoS) over the 
interconnection in order to weaken competitors, or to favour affiliated 
services over unaffiliated ones (CRÉMER, REY & TIROLE, 2000). The issue 
is very real, but we felt that it was not a significant concern for Europe. First, 
the threat of anticompetitive behaviour is much less in Europe because our 
broadband markets are more robustly competitive than those of the US – 
effective competition inhibits this kind of behavour. Second, the European 
regulatory framework already provides tools to deal with any problems that 
might emerge here (see also CAVE & CROCIONI, 2008; MARCUS, 2008). 
The Commission's modest proposed enhancements to the regulatory 
framework to facilitate informed consumer choice, and to reduce switching 
costs, seem to be more than adequate at this time. 
It is important to note what we did not recommend. First, we did not 
recommend any regulatory controls at the retail level – neither in regard to 
charging principles, nor as regards the level of charges. 5 One could debate 
endlessly whether consumers are better served by Calling Party Pays 
(CPP), 6 Receiving Party Pays (RPP), or flat rates at the retail level. We 
think that this is first and foremost a choice for the market, not for the 
regulator. Other things being equal, the regulator might wish to choose 
wholesale remedies that place as few constraints as possible on retail 
arrangements; otherwise, we see no reason to treat this as a regulatory 
matter at all. 7
5 The WIK 2008 report did not address roaming. Roaming poses special challenges, not only at 
the wholesale level but also at the retail level. This author thinks that the Commission’s initiative 
to regulate retail prices for voice mobile roaming in 2007 was appropriate. 
6 CPP at the retail level should not be confused with Calling Party’s Network Pays (CPNP) at 
the wholesale level. They are often found together, but they are not the same thing. 
7 We note that a number of trade press articles incorrectly cited WIK (2008) as advocating the 
use of RPP at the retail level. 26     No. 72, 4
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Second, even though a number of the authors of WIK (2008) see great merit 
in the system used in the US, we did not literally recommend its adoption in 
Europe. One of the great attractions of the US system is that it achieves 
termination rates in many cases (not all) through negotiation between the 
parties, rather than by regulatory rate-setting. This leads to low rates, as 
previously noted, due to obligations of reciprocity of rates, and because fixed 
incumbents with market power are limited to cost-based rates. 
We see no obvious way to gradually phase in a system based on the exact 
US model, and we have concerns that neither consumers nor service 
providers could react overnight to the implementation of such a system. 
Service providers would likely choose to shift their retail pricing models 
under such an arrangement by (1) lowering usage charges, (2) reducing 
handset subsidies, and (3) increasing monthly fixed fees. We think that all of 
this would need time to settle in; consequently, we did not advocate an 
approach that would imply a "flag day" all-or-nothing transition. 
If a US-like system were desired, the fast glide path would still be an 
appropriate way to get there. By setting the maximum end rate to zero, 
rather than a low but non-zero value, Europe could end up with 
arrangements that are economically roughly equivalent to those of the US 
but with a gradual phase-in (and also without the need for the kind of messy 
fine-tuning of the system that was required in the United States - see 
MARCUS, 2004). 
  Recent developments: The ERG Consultation (2008) 
The European Regulators' Group (ERG) developed a second public 
consultation on IP-based interconnection in 2007 (ERG, 2007, 2008). 
The ERG (2008) report reviews the differences between the switched 
network and the emerging NGN, and considers the drivers for change. It 
reflects on the differences between switched networks and NGN, in terms of 
the separation of network from service; the inherent cost structure; and the 
number of points of interconnection. 
With that basis of analysis established, the ERG offers a range of 
conclusions and recommendations. Significantly, they conclude that "[…] the 
move to NGNs does not provide an opportunity to roll back regulation on 
existing services if the competitive conditions have not changed." J. S. MARCUS  27 
The ERG sees a possible need to ensure (perhaps through the 
application of Article 5 of the Access and Interconnection Directive) full end 
to end connectivity and interoperability at an appropriate level of Quality of 
Service. This implies the need for operators to use standard protocols and 
interfaces, and to provide information on their use. 
The document assesses the relative merits of CPNP versus US-style Bill 
and Keep arrangements at length; however, it appears to stop short of 
definitively advocating one system versus the other. One might reasonably 
infer that the national regulators who comprise ERG did not reach full 
consensus on this point. 
Finally, ERG (2008) contains a useful discussion of regulatory concerns 
during the transition period, when switched networks and IP-based NGNs 
operate in parallel. 
  Recent developments:
The European Commission's consultation (2008) 
The Commission's consultation document (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
2008a) is much less philosophical than the ERG document; instead, it is 
much more concrete and applied. The Commission was apparently 
concerned primarily with the wide disparity among termination rates among 
Member States, and secondarily with the high levels of those rates. The 
Commission document considers only briefly a possible change of wholesale 
charging mechanism to anything other than cost-based CPNP; their focus is 
instead on the level of rates, and on the means by which those rates are 
determined. 
The consultation document would require Member State NRAs to compute 
costs pursuant to the following principles by the end of 2011: 
x  Costs should be computed for an efficient operator using modern 
technology, based on bottom-up modeling of long-run incremental costs 
(LRIC). Current or legacy costs are not relevant. For mobile operators, the 
access should be assumed to reflect a mix of 2G and 3G, while for both 
fixed and mobile operators the network core should be assumed to be NGN. 
x  The cost computation should reflect only avoidable costs associated 
with the voice service. Costs associated with other services are excluded, as 
are costs that are non-traffic-related. 28     No. 72, 4
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x  The Commission acknowledged that there are benefits to both calling 
and called parties; nonetheless, they supported recovery of the full avoidable 
costs of terminating the call in the wholesale charge. 
x  In the absence of an objective cost difference outside of the control of 
the operators, each Member State should have only one rate for fixed 
operators, and another for mobile operators (i.e. they should be symmetric
between mobile operators, and also between fixed operators). The only valid 
cost difference that the Commission has identified flows from the differences 
between 900 MHz versus 1800 MHz spectrum. 
These changes would collectively imply a migration to much lower fixed 
and mobile termination rates than those that pertain today. Where the 
current European average mobile termination rate is €0.967 per minute 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2008a), these changes might imply a 
reduction to something like € 0.02 or € 0.03. 
  Concluding observations 
An important unifying thread among all three documents is the apparent 
desire to substantially reduce mobile termination rates over the next few 
years. The WIK 2008 report advocated reduction to a low rate, possibly but 
not necessarily zero, over the next three to five years. The ERG 2008 report 
seems to lean in the direction of adopting Bill and Keep, effectively reducing 
the rate to zero. The European Commission consultation would use a 
different mechanism to reduce the rate to perhaps €0.02 or €0.03 per minute 
by the end of 2011. 
The ERG and Commission approaches should be similar in effect, but they 
also differ in important ways. The adoption of a zero rate potentially 
simplifies the regulator's job substantially, once it is firmly in place. The 
regulator could perhaps escape the burdensome cycle of constantly arguing 
whether the rate should be half a euro cent higher or lower. Zero is clear and 
unambiguous. 
On the other hand, it may be easier to sustain the Commission's approach 
against legal challenge, since it is firmly grounded in established concepts of 
cost-orientation of call termination prices and in the Commission's authority 
under the Framework Directive to coordinate implementation of the J. S. MARCUS  29 
regulatory framework. It may be easier to argue that the Commission's 
approach is proportionate (i.e. no more intrusive than necessary). 
A substantial reduction in termination rates, however achieved, should result 
in substantial benefits for the great majority of Europeans – greater ability 
and willingness to use their mobile services, and more cost-effective retail 
arrangements. Significantly, the reduction in overall economic distortion to 
fixed and mobile services helps to establish necessary preconditions for a 
smooth migration to IP-based services. 30     No. 72, 4
th Q. 2008 
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